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THE SUBMISSION OF THE SOVEREIGN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
COMPATIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cameron Oren Hunter*
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the perennial concerns with international law is that it exists merely as
a legal fiction. While there are many considerable problems that plague the
coherence of international law and its prospects for success (including questions of
enforceability, democracy, and unity), the focus of this paper is narrower.
Specifically, the primary inquiry of this paper is whether the notion of sovereignty
is compatible with the limitations imposed by treaties and international laws. At
the core of this issue is the apparent paradox of freedom. This paradox is
illustrated by the question of whether an entity can maintain freedom and
simultaneously retain the ability to become bound. On the one hand, if an entity
becomes bound, through submission to treaties for example, it suffers a loss of
freedom. On the other hand, if an entity is prohibited from becoming so bound,
this prohibition also functions as an impediment to freedom. In this paper, I
examine these questions in the context of the sovereign state vis-A-vis international
laws and treaties, and recommend a potential reconciliation to the paradox. This
reconciliation lies in a simple reformulation of the concepts of autonomy and
sovereignty, relying on the connection drawn between the two by Timothy
Endicott. This reformulation consists of the recognition that the truest
manifestations of autonomy and sovereignty include the possibility of the
abdication of that power. In line with the thinking of Immanuel Kant, true
freedom, and the fullest expression of sovereignty, is contained within the ability
to self-legislate, and to accept and remain subject to limitation.
Having suggested a potential answer to the problem, I briefly survey
contemporary international law through the lens of the International Court of
Justice and its operations, to see if it comports with the solution articulated herein.
The question will then be raised as to whether a sovereign state, having bound
itself through submission to either international law or to the terms of a treaty, can
step outside of the bounds of its obligation and engage in a kind of civil
disobedience on the international stage, while simultaneously remaining sovereign.
With the foregoing in place, I conclude with an examination of what it means for a
. The author is a recent J.D. and Philosophy M.A. graduate of the University of Denver, having
completed his two degrees in the spring of 2016, after the initial submission of this paper but before its
publication. He would like to thank Candace Upton for her extensive feedback on earlier drafts of this
paper, as well as the staff of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy for their thoughtful
edits.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
sovereign state to truly become bound. This will aid in determining the precise
extent to which a sovereign may bind itself, and correspondingly, just how free a
sovereign state is.
II. THE PARADOX
In order to explore the paradox of freedom, Jean L. Cohen articulates a useful
definition of sovereignty:
It.. .has an internal and external dimension. Internally, sovereignty
involves supremacy: a claim to unified comprehensive, supreme,
exclusive, and direct authority within a territory over its inhabitants
construed as members of a polity. The correlative external dimension
involves a claim to autonomy from outside powers. External sovereignty
entails independence and impermeability of the territorial state to
jurisdictional claims or political control by foreign authorities.'
Sovereignty thus carries with it requirements relating to both the domestic and
the foreign. In this paper I will focus on an examination of sovereignty in the
external, foreign context.
In framing the paradox to which this paper responds, Timothy Endicott
writes: "[t]o be free is not to be bound. In a sense, then, a state is not free if it is
bound by treaties. Yet a state would be constrained by a severe disability if it
lacked the capacity to pursue its purposes by entering into treaties." 2 The paradox
of freedom for the sovereign is whether the sovereign is so mighty as to be
incapable of becoming bound, or so mighty as to be able to bind itself completely.
3
To avoid the appearance of a false dilemma, utter inalienability and complete
capitulation are not the only two options argued for by legal philosophers.
Endicott draws an excellent parallel between the autonomous individual and the
sovereign state, in an effort to more effectively understand and engage the
1. JEAN L. COHEN, SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION: RETHINKING
LEGALITY, LEGITIMACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 26-27 (2010),
https://mgnyunt.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/globalization-sovereignty.pdf.
2. Timothy Endicott, The Logic of Freedom and Power, in THE PHIL. OF INT'L LAW 245, 246
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas, eds., 2010), https://iuristebi.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/the-
philosophy-of-intemational-law.pdf.
3. Id. at 246, note 3 (citing Henry Shue, Limiting Sovereignty, in 16 HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION & INT'L REL. (Jennifer M. Welsh, ed., 2003).). Endicott notes that other legal
philosophers, and specifically Henry Shue, argue that sovereignty is necessarily limited because
sovereignty, as a right, implies duties to other states, and that the principle of non-intervention presents
a limitation to all sovereign states. However, this seems to be a practical objection, rather than a
conceptual one. Surely, it is possible to envision an international theater in which only one state is
sovereign and all others enjoy only limited freedom in deference to the sovereign state. Therefore, the
notion of sovereignty does not appear to be threatened by the concerns raised by Shue. The conception
of sovereignty advocated herein also allows for limits, but these limits must be voluntarily undertaken.
A sovereign is limited by the sovereignty of another state only to the extent that it willingly refrains
from imposing upon that state's sovereignty.
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problem. 4 This autonomous person analogue demonstrates an effort to carve out a
middle ground. John Locke, while having a robust sense of property and self-
ownership, argued that this self-governance ended at the threshold of selling
oneself into slavery. 5 For Locke, complete forfeiture of autonomy constitutes a
violation of autonomy. 6  Therefore, on his view, not only can autonomy be
restrained in this way and yet retain its autonomous status, it is required that this
restraint be placed upon autonomy, lest it violate itself. However, this middle
ground is far from uncontested territory. Robert Nozick insists that this ownership
of self is absolute, arguing that logical consistency demands a freedom to do with
oneself as one pleases, up to and including the complete abdication of autonomy. 7
In approaching this problem, Endicott draws upon what he views as an
inconsistency in the work of John Stuart Mill. He argues that Mill adopts an
absolutist approach to human autonomy pursuant to Mill's insistence that harm to
others is the only acceptable basis for limiting autonomy. 8 Yet, as Endicott points
out, Mill claims that slavery, even when voluntarily entered into, violates this
autonomy,9 seemingly because such would constitute the ultimate relinquishment
of autonomy. Mill writes, "by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty;
he foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act."10 Voluntary abdication of
autonomy for Mill, as for Locke, is impermissible." But, Endicott inquires, what
of contracts? Concerning Mill's favorable view of the enforceability of
contracts, 12 Endicott protests that under such a view, "I am allowed to alienate my
freedom to use my car."' 3 He continues:
If we do have liberty to regulate our affairs by mutual agreement, and
the regulation to be enforceable against my will, why are we not to have
the liberty to regulate our affairs by agreeing that I will be your slave? If
4. Id. at 252. Throughout this paper, the hypothetical sovereign state will be treated
anthropomorphically in order to retain the analogy between the state and the individual, and to serve as
a heuristic for the inner-workings of a state, including its government and its citizens.
5. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 10 (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2008) (1689),
http://www.earlymodemtexts.com/assets/pdfs/Ilocke 689a.pdf.
6. Id.
7. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 58 (1974); see also J. Philmore, The
Libertarian Case for Slavery, in 14 THE PHILOSOPHICAL FORUM NO. 1, 43, 43 (1982), available at
http://cog.kent.edu/lib/Philmorel/Philmorel.htm ("[p]eople are only allowed the temporary security
afforded by capitalizing a portion of their earning power (i.e., by renting or hiring themselves out for a
specified time period), but are denied the freedom of obtaining a maximum of security by selling all of
their human capital").
8. Endicott, supra note 2, at 24749; JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13, 69-70, 76 (1859),
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf.
9. Endicott, supra note 2, at 24749; MILL, supra note 8, at 94-96.
10. MILL, supra note 8, at 94-96.
11. Id.; LOCKE, supra note 5.
12. MILL, supra note 8, at 89 ("[i]t is usual and right that the law, when a contract is entered into,
should require... that certain formalities should be observed... in case of subsequent dispute, [that]
there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into").
13. Endicott, supra note 2, at 248.
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it is freedom to be able to bind myself to deliver my car to the purchaser
(with the resultant loss of freedom after I agree), why is it not freedom
to be allowed to bind myself to be a slave (with the resultant loss of
freedom after I agree)? 14
As Mill purports to allow for the voluntary surrender of some freedom (as in
the forfeiture of the freedom to use some commodity that is sold to another),
Endicott wonders what prevents the autonomous individual from surrendering all
of that freedom, as in the case of slavery.' 5 The prohibition placed on the total
abdication of autonomy seems somewhat arbitrary. Endicott suggests that the
solution to this paradox lies in the denial of an absolute autonomy. 16 However,
Endicott is perhaps too quick to abandon the absolutist conception.
III. RECONCILIATIONS
In his attempts to resolve the paradox of whether a sovereign is so powerful
that it cannot bind itself, or so powerful that it can subject itself to any degree of
restriction, Endicott writes that "[t]he solutions in the two cases [of state and
person] demand an understanding of what it takes for a person to lead a good life,
and for a state to be a good state."'17  Endicott's solution is to introduce an
additional principle by which to adjudicate between the two prongs of the paradox.
He appeals to the good of the state as this guiding principle,' 8 and declares that
State sovereignty is a complex of various forms of power and
independence that is complete for the purposes of states. In the case of
states, the resolution of the paradox of freedom lies in an identification
of those powers and forms of independence. The purposes of states are
identical with the purposes that a good state actually pursues. So the
content of sovereignty is determined by the powers and forms of
independence that a state needs in order to be a good state) 9
However, such a third principle is unnecessary, for one need not look beyond
the two options contemplated within the paradox itself for a solution. The paradox
arises from the misunderstanding that neither of the two competing options is
coherent, and thus that there is need of some third consideration. However, this
understanding is incorrect, as a coherent defense can be given for one of the two
competing conceptions of sovereignty: the conception of sovereignty as the ability
to surrender sovereign power. If such a defense is possible, then Endicott's move
beyond the paradox by appealing to an additional principle, the good of the state, is
an unnecessary one, as the paradox is resolved through a closer examination of
sovereignty and the notion of what it means to become bound. Endicott's solution
14. Id.
15. Id. at 247-49.
16. Id. at 252.
17. Id. at 247.
18. The "good" here is understood in the normative sense.
19. Endicott, supra note 2, at 252.
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to the problem perhaps possesses pragmatic utility, in that it can provide guidance
as to which limitations a state should become bound. But in doing so, his solution
abandons the quest to resolve the initial paradox of whether true freedom consists
of the ability or the inability to surrender the freedom that makes it sovereign.
Therefore, Endicott's "solution" to the paradox of freedom proves to be no
solution at all.
Endicott is therefore overly hasty in his desertion of absolute autonomy, and it
is this premature rejection that causes him to look beyond the mark while
grappling with the problem. The concept of absolute autonomy coheres with the
concept of sovereignty far better than a watered down account of freedom. The
notion of sovereignty denotes supreme power and authority, 20 a definition saturated
with absolutism. Supreme power must be accompanied by absolute autonomy, or
it simply fails to be supreme. Something less than this complete autonomy implies
some constraint, some impediment to total power, some threat to true sovereignty.
The disposal of an absolute conception of autonomy necessitates the disposal of
sovereignty itself, as something less than supreme power and authority will be
represented by the diminished conception. For this reason, the legal philosopher
must be cautious in rejecting absolute autonomy, lest she inadvertently do away
with the entirety of the concept of sovereignty. Endicott's arguments must be
closely scrutinized in order to determine if the abandonment of absolute autonomy,
and, by extension, sovereignty itself, is the only way to escape the paradox. I
suggest that it is not.
Rather than a wholesale rejection of absolute autonomy, one must simply bite
one of the two bullets of the paradox.21 In the affirmation of an absolute concept
of autonomy, one must accept either that an autonomous individual may become
bound to the point of a complete eradication of autonomy, or that the individual is
limited from engaging in activities that would be detrimental to her autonomy,
which is itself a limit to autonomy. The question, then, is which of these appears
to better exemplify autonomy.
A potential answer regarding which bullet to bite lies within the writings of
Immanuel Kant. Kant suggests that true autonomy consists of the ability to self-
legislate, or of the imposition of bounds upon oneself.2 2 It appears then, that Kant
accepts the first of the two paradoxical bullets enumerated above: an autonomous
individual is capable of binding herself out of her autonomy. Kant articulates both
a negative and a positive definition of autonomy. His negative definition consists
20. Sovereignty, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sovereignty
(last visited Mar. 5, 2016).
21. Bite the Bullet, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/bite%20the%20bullet (last visited Mar. 5, 2016). As used here, to bite one of
two bullets is to do one of two unpleasant or painful things because it is necessary, even though one
would prefer to avoid doing so.
22. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 45 (Mary Gregor trans.,
1997) (1785), http://blog.nus.edu.sg/acerwei/files/2012/12/Kant-Groundwork-ng0pby.pdf.
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of being free from alien restraints, free from heteronomy.23 His positive definition
is illustrated by the being who selects her own ends.24 The counterargument to the
position Kant elucidates, and to the position this paper endorses, is that any
bounds, even self-selected bounds, are an impediment to autonomy and freedom.
However, the response to this objection lies in the fact that all action necessarily
binds or limits autonomy. In opting for and pursuing one course, one is no longer
free to choose and pursue an alternative course that she might have pursued. She is
free to course-correct, but in choosing course a at time x, and in following up with
the actions consistent with that choice, she is no longer free to choose course b at
time x, because she selected course a and acted upon that decision. The selection
and pursuit of any action necessarily precludes the pursuit of other, incompatible
actions. One is often free to change courses later, but in choosing and following
through with some action, an agent loses out on other courses of action she might
have initially pursued. Since it is impossible to completely refrain from action, all
autonomous creatures are constantly acting. 25 All creatures are thus at any given
moment either acting under alien influence, or acting under their own will. If the
above objection (that any bounds, even those that are self-selected, hinder
autonomy) is a valid objection, it would follow that no creature could possibly be
autonomous, as all creatures, through making decisions and taking action, are
constantly precluding other routes they might have taken, and are thus constantly
imposing bounds upon themselves. Therefore, if a coherent understanding of
autonomy is to be retained, partial forfeiture of autonomy by an autonomous
choice must be possible. Without this understanding, autonomy is impossible, as
all agents are constantly forfeiting partial autonomy by acting, thereby precluding
other actions. And if partial forfeiture of autonomy is compatible with autonomy,
so too is complete forfeiture, absent a compelling limiting principle. Endicott,
Mill, and Locke fail to provide such a limiting principle. It is in this sense then
that autonomy is absolute: it allows such a robust and radical self-ownership that
even its complete abdication is possible.26 In spite of his opposition to the absolute
notion of autonomy, Endicott beautifully describes how this radical conception
would look were he to affirm it: "the choice to pursue a course that will deprive me
of all freedom-leaving me a hostage, a prisoner for life, a slave. . .can be a true
expression of my own independence and autonomyFalse Then, it would be vicious
to interfere with my freedom to sacrifice my freedom."2 7  Far from limiting
autonomy, the ability to exercise autonomy until its own obliteration constitutes a
23. Id. at 50.
24. Id. at 45.
25. The instance of the comatose patient, and other situations in which an individual is incapable
of action or intention, are admittedly instances of a person who is not an autonomous agent, and are
thus precluded from this discussion.
26. See MILL, supra note 8, at 13. This is not to say however, that there are not other principles
that might serve to limit autonomy. John Stuart Mill's harm principle, which limits autonomy when it
threatens others, might be one such example.
27. Endicott, supra note 2, at 250.
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full consummation of freedom. This is perhaps what Endicott is onto when he
writes: "[b]eing bound.. .is an aspect of a normative ordering of our lives that
enhances my autonomy. My life is more my own to live, because of my ability to
,,28bind myself to perform agreements.
The absolutist view then takes on a reconstructed form, as an understanding
of autonomy as a condition absolutely free of any and all limitation is incoherent.
This reformulation is reminiscent of the move made to defend the omnipotence of
God. The paradigmatic charge against God's omnipotence was that it was a
logical inconsistency to say that His omnipotence meant that He possessed the
power to bring about "any state, of affairs whatsoever." 29  Examples of the
problems with such an understanding include the charges that God would be
unable to create a rock so large that He could not lift it, and that He would be
unable to alter the necessary truths of logic and mathematics. In response,
omnipotence was not done away with, but merely reformulated. A common
contemporary interpretation of this trait is that it refers to "maximal power," or that
a being is omnipotent "provided that its overall power is not possibly exceeded by
any [other] being., 30 With this re-defining of the term, the notion of God as
omnipotent remains intact. 31 A similar move is proposed here with the notion of
autonomy. To say that autonomy means freedom to do any and all things, but
simultaneously that autonomous acts cannot lead to a reduction in autonomy, is not
logically coherent. Therefore, a differing conception is requisite, if the term is to
survive. As I have suggested, this reconceptualization consists of autonomy as
radical self-ownership, such that any and all actions may be engaged in, up to and
including the complete forfeiture of autonomy itself.
IV. APPLICATION To THE SOVEREIGN
The previous section was devoted to a rejection of Endicott's non-absolutist
concept of sovereignty, and to exploring personal autonomy in light of the
connection Endicott made between autonomy and sovereignty. Emerging from the
question of autonomy, the task is now to see whether the parameters of autonomy
translate into guiding principles for state sovereignty. I have explored a robust
conception of autonomy, and suggested that it overcomes the logical tension
Endicott elucidated. The same tension exists for sovereignty, and I suggest that it
is resolved in the same way. Sovereignty also appears threatened by the possibility
of a diminished power of self-govemance.32 However, that is because the concept
of sovereignty, as that which is absolutely free from any kind of limitation, is
incoherent. A reformulation of sovereignty, one that recognizes that its fullest
expression lies in the possibility of its permanent renunciation, breathes fresh life
28. Id. at 248.
29. Joshua Hoffman & Gary Rosenkrantz, Omnipotence, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipotence/#2.
30. Id.
31. See id
32. Endicott, supra note 2.
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into the concept, and allows for an intelligible discussion of sovereignty and its
limits.
Kant's view of self-legislation as the ultimate exemplification of freedom
informs the proper conception of the sovereign. 33 As the fullest manifestation of
autonomy is the ability to abdicate that very autonomy, so too is sovereignty fully
realized in the ability to yield that sovereign power. A concept of sovereignty, like
a concept of autonomy, which espouses the view that the presence of any
constraint is incompatible with that power, is itself nonsensical. States, like
individuals, engage in actions. As discussed above, actions necessarily preclude
other actions, and therefore, by acting, a state limits what it is free to do. A notion
of sovereignty that calls for an absolute bar to any and all limits is unintelligible,
and is therefore to be rejected. Sovereignty, properly understood as allowing, and
in fact requiring, the ability to surrender either some or all sovereign power, is a
concept that is plausible in the international theater.
However, these limits, acceptable under this understanding of sovereignty,
must be self-imposed limits. Heteronomy, or resultant action caused due to
influences external to the individual or state, is incompatible with and antithetical
to autonomy, 34 and, by extension, to sovereignty. Therefore, international law has
but one recourse to legitimacy: the voluntary self-binding of each state to the good
of the global community. 35 Sovereignty is thus compatible with international law
only insofar as nations voluntarily assent to it. Legitimacy is attained only when
states willingly bind themselves to each other, and any heteronomous means,
compulsory or otherwise, threaten to dismantle this international project. Coercion
invalidates the system and undue influence threatens the entirety of the enterprise.
Sovereignty only finds its actualization in the ability to willingly surrender that
power.
V. REFLECTIONS ON THE GROUND
To have legitimate international law, it is not enough for it to be conceptually
possible. The practices must mirror the theory. More specifically, articulating a
legitimate conception of international law does not automatically legitimize the
system currently in place. The system must be consistent with the conception in
order for it to achieve the articulated legitimacy. It must then be asked: is this
conception of sovereignty reflected in how international law currently operates?
Does it reflect how things are on the ground? To answer these questions, an
examination of the current international theater is warranted in order to determine
whether the stage is set in a manner conducive to the kind of sovereignty
contemplated within this paper.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) may serve as the paradigm and
representative for contemporary international law. If there is anywhere to look for
33. KANT, supra note 22.
34. Id. at 41.
35. See id
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answers in this inquiry, it is the United Nations (UN).36 The ICJ is "principle
judicial organ" of the UN, and is thus ideally situated for an examination of the
current practices of international law. 37 The ICJ handles two kinds of cases: legal
disputes between states that have been submitted to the court by the states
(contentious cases) and requests for advisory opinions. 38 In line with the theory of
sovereignty articulated above, the ICJ's authority is limited to those states that
have consented to its jurisdiction. 39 This comports well with Kant's account of
self-legislation. 40 If freedom is realized in acts of voluntary self-binding, and if
sovereignty can be preserved in only this way, then this is just the kind of system
needed to allow for states to engage in self-legislation, a system without
compulsion.4 1 Such a system free of coercion is necessary, as such pressure would
invalidate the legitimacy of the endeavor.
A state may consent to the authority of the ICJ in three different ways:
agreeing to submit a dispute to the ICJ; the triggering of a clause contained within
a treaty which grants the ICJ authority to resolve an issue; or through general
declarations to be bound to the authority of ICJ in the event of a dispute with a
state which has a similar declaration.42 All three of these methods appear to align
with the above elucidation of sovereignty: it consists in the freedom of states to
voluntarily bind themselves, and to become subject to the authority of an external
entity.
Two cases will serve initially to demonstrate whether the ICJ functions, or at
least whether it can function, in a way conducive to state sovereignty with those
cases that it entertains. The first example that I consider of the ICJ exercising this
authority is Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, a contentious case submitted to the ICJ for
adjudication.43 In this case, Costa Rica sought relief from the ICJ on the grounds
that Nicaragua had occupied a portion of its territory with its army and had
intentionally harmed Costa Rica's rainforests and wetlands in its construction of a
canal.44 The ICJ took on the case only in light of the fact that Costa Rica invoked
the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, which Costa Rica and Nicaragua had
both signed and ratified.45 Article XXXI of the Treaty provides that the ICJ shall
36. What We Do, U.N., http://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/index.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2016) (Formed shortly after World War II, the U.N. is an international coalition tasked with "the
maintenance of international peace and security.").
37. The Court, I.C.J., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l (last visited Dec. 31, 2015).
38. How the Court Works, I.C.J., http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pl=l&p2=6 (last visited
Dec. 31, 2015) [hereinafter I0].
39. Id.
40. KANT, supra note 22.
41. Id.
42. ICJ, supra note 38.
43. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Application Instituting Proceedings (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 50/16279.pdf.
44. Id.
45. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement ("Pact of Bogota") art. 31, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S.
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46have jurisdiction over disputes between the parties to the treaty. The ICJ takes
special care to state precisely how it possessed jurisdiction over the case, and this
stringent adherence to its limits is conducive to the conception of sovereignty
articulated in this paper.
The second example is that of Australia v. Japan, another contentious case
submitted to the ICJ. 48 Australia brought this action against Japan claiming that
Japan's whaling practices constituted a breach of the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling. 49 The ICJ accepted jurisdiction over the matter due to
declarations made by the parties that the ICJ should have jurisdiction should such a
dispute arise, Australia having made its declaration on March 22, 2002, and Japan
having made its declaration on July 9, 2007.5o That the ICJ's acceptance of this
case was contingent upon the declarations made by the states involved again
demonstrates a commitment on the part of the ICJ to accept jurisdiction only over
states that have agreed to such.5'
But perhaps even more important than those cases the ICJ entertains are the
cases it does not entertain. Whether the ICJ does in fact limit its jurisdiction to
those cases over which it gains jurisdiction through one of the three methods
described above is perhaps the truest test of its respect for, and deference to, state
sovereignty. Whether the ICJ actually declines to hear any cases is one way this
can be demonstrated. One such case is that of Yugoslavia v. United States of
America.52  This case arose when Yugoslavia instituted proceedings against the
United States, alleging that the United States had violated its obligation not to use
force against Yugoslavia by bombing Yugoslav territory.53 Yugoslavia argued that
jurisdiction was proper pursuant to Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 54 to which both Yugoslavia and the
United States were parties.55 The convention provided that disputes between the
parties to the convention regarding the "interpretation, application or fulfillment"
of the convention were to be submitted to the ICJ.5 6 The court did not dispute the
46. Id.
47. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
Application Instituting Proceedings (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 50/16279.pdf.
48. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening), Application Instituting
Proceedings (May 31, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf.
49. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
50. Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. intervening), Application Instituting
Proceedings (May 31, 2009), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf.
51. Id.
52. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 1999
I.C.J. (June 2, 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 14/14129.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 9, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
55. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 1999
I.C.J. (June 2, 1999), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1 14/14129.pdf.
56. Genocide Convention, supra note 54, art. IX.
VOL. 44:4
2016 COMPATIBILITY OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 531
existence of the convention, nor the fact that both countries were parties to that
convention, but it pointed out that the United States ratified the convention with a
reservation.57  This reservation provided that, regarding Article IX of the
convention, before the United States could be properly made a party to any action
under the jurisdiction of the ICJ, its specific consent was required.5 8  This
reservation was not prohibited by the convention, nor was it objected to by
Yugoslavia. 59 The court observed that the United States had not provided its
consent, and that it had indicated that it would not do so. 60 Therefore, the court
held that it did not have jurisdiction over the case.6 1
This case is an important illustration of the ICJ's refusal to entertain cases
over which it does not have jurisdiction, even in the weightiest of circumstances.
The court noted that it was "deeply concerned with the human tragedy, the loss of
life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo" that had preceded this action, and
further articulated its concern "with the continuing loss of life and human suffering
in all parts of Yugoslavia." 62  In spite of the enormity of the circumstances
surrounding the action, the ICJ declined to hear a case over which it did not have
jurisdiction. In refusing to hear the case, the court stated that it "does not
automatically have jurisdiction over legal disputes between States," and further,
that "one of the fundamental principles of [the Court] is that it cannot decide a
dispute between States without the consent of those States to its jurisdiction." 63
The rejection of this case is encouraging in terms of the court's determination to
adhere to the principles of sovereignty, and its refusal to overstep its bounds. The
acceptance of this case might have allowed the court to exert tremendous political
influence, and yet it refused, recognizing that it did not have jurisdiction. These
cases, when considered together, indicate that the requisite freedom, or at least an
encouraging start, is provided by current international law, such that states can
recognize and exercise the kind of sovereignty articulated in this paper.
VI. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE OF THE SOVEREIGN
It therefore appears that the notions of sovereignty and international law are at
least conceptually compatible, as the fullest expression of sovereignty requires the
ability to willingly abrogate that sovereign power (one example of which would be
conformity to international law). It appears further that one of the paradigm
examples of the current status international law, the ICJ, comports with this
conceptual theory, as the court only exercises its power over those sovereign states
57. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Order, 1999 I.C.J. (June 2, 1999),
http ://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 14/14129.pdf.
58. Id. 1 21.
59. Id. 24.
60. Id. 27.
61. Id. 28.
62. Id. 15.
63. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), Order, 1999 I.C.J., 19 (June 2, 1999),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 14/14129.pdf.
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that voluntary acquiesce to its jurisdiction. But can a state violate an agreement to
which it has voluntarily bound itself? Assuming it is for noble and not merely self-
serving reasons, can a state engage in a kind of international civil disobedience?
Generally, civil disobedience refers to an act of a citizen, rather than a state, in
which she disobeys the laws of her nation, in an effort to see the law altered. 64
However, the question is pertinent here, as the subject of consideration is that of
becoming bound. May a sovereign state breach a self-imposed bound if it appears
that its breach will serve purposes similar to the aims of the citizen who engages in
civil disobedience?
Civil disobedience on the domestic scale is perhaps more complicated than
this kind of "civil disobedience" might be in an international arena. For the
individual defying the laws of her country, one of the central questions that arises
is whether the individual is bound by those laws in the first place. 65 It must then be
determined where this obligation arises from, be it grounded in the citizen's
consent, actions invoking the principle of fairness, or some other source. 66 Only
then can the question of civil disobedience itself be engaged. In the international
context, with the articulation of sovereignty as something that allows for its own
alienation, the question is similar: from what source does an international
obligation arise, provided there is such an obligation? If the only valid enactment
of international law consists in the voluntary binding of states to each other, then
the source of the obligation is obvious: it rests on a clear expression of consent by
the sovereign state.
67
As a preliminary matter, an articulation of civil disobedience is required.
Four generally accepted criteria for civil disobedience include: conscientiousness,
communication, publicity, and non-violence. 68 Generally, conscientiousness refers
to an intentional breach of the law. 69 Communication refers to an explicit attempt
both to reject the law then on the books and to call for change. 70 Publicity requires
that the disobedience be public, as a violation that went unnoticed would have little
chance at changing the law.71 Finally, civil disobedience generally consists of
activity that is non-violent. 72  This concept of civil disobedience must be
understood before the question of whether states can engage in an international
civil disobedience can be addressed.
64. Kimberly Brownlee, Civil Disobedience, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (last
updated Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/#FeaCivDis
[hereinafter Civil Disobedience].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. In a moral context, the notion of consent is somewhat problematic. However, many of these
problems arise when consent is claimed to be the basis of moral obligation. This question of morality is
undoubtedly beyond the scope of this paper. Consent is presented here as the basis for legal obligation.
68. Civil Disobedience, supra note 64.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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As the term "civil disobedience" does not necessarily refer to anything states
do (as states do not think and act in the same way individuals do), it is important to
understand how this question would even arise for the sovereign in an international
context.73 Just as a citizen engages in civil disobedience when conscientiously,
communicatively, publicly, and peacefully violating the law, so too does a state
engage in a similar act when it defies international law in this way. The question
then is: can a state engage in such an action? Or more specifically, can a state
engage in such an action in a manner compatible with its sovereignty? Again, the
object of this examination is the state that has voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of an external authority, such as the ICJ, and has thus become bound to
one of its decrees, or voluntarily become bound to some agreement with another
state, or voluntarily become bound in some other way. With this framework, the
inquiry is whether a state can violate the bounds to which it has subjected itself,
even for reasons perceived to be noble.
The abdication of sovereignty at this point appears less troublesome than the
abdication of autonomy, as there are many issues bound up with autonomy that are
absent for the issue of sovereignty. As Endicott noted: "[u]nlike a slavery contract,
a treaty of confederation could be a legitimate act of sovereignty, even if it
terminates a nation's sovereignty. A free state might exercise its sovereignty well
for the purposes of a good state, precisely in building a new nation along with
other states. 74 The implicit assumption by Endicott is that there is no situation in
which slavery would enhance a person's good, in a moral sense. Moreover, civil
disobedience itself almost always entails additional moral considerations. 75 The
same may be said for any kind of promise. Consider the individual who
voluntarily makes the promise that she will not cross a certain chalk line that
encircles her, until some event comes to pass (e.g., permission from the promisee,
or the passage of a certain amount of time). Is that individual obligated to remain
within the chalk parameters until death from hunger or thirst overtakes her? This
question comes down to a collision between the values of honesty/integrity and the
sanctity of life. However, the aim of this paper is not to adjudicate between these
two competing goods, nor is its ambition moral analysis. Rather, the question is
one of freedom, and specifically the freedom of the state. While the state, if it
were to cease to exist, would not necessarily result in the loss of life, certainly it is
possible to craft an example in which a state finds itself having to decide in
between honoring an agreement, and the potential for loss of life. Such an
example might include the instance in which a state upholds a treaty knowing it
will lead to war. But again, in this paper I avoid addressing the question of
integrity versus life, and consider the problem descriptively and modally, not
normatively. In other words, the question presented here is not what the sovereign
state should do, but what it can do. The articulation of sovereignty adopted herein
73. Id.
74. Endicott, supra note 2, at 259.
75. These considerations may also take other forms, including legal or procedural concerns.
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is that sovereign states have the ability to bind themselves, even to the abdication
of sovereignty itself. Therefore, the question is whether a sovereign state, having
bound itself in this way, has the ability to defy a decree to which it has become
bound and yet remain sovereign. Can a sovereign state engage in international
civil disobedience by defying bounds it has taken upon itself? With this
understanding of sovereignty, the question must be answered in the negative.
If the question were answered in the affirmative, what would this say of the
sovereignty of that state? If bounds can be broken any time a state wills it, was the
state really bound at all? And if the state lacks the ability to bind itself, what does
this say of its sovereignty? Even if a state follows the generally accepted criteria
for civil disobedience, breaching an obligation conscientiously, communicatively,
publicly, and peacefully, and does so for noble reasons, such a breach of a self-
imposed bound runs contrary to the conception of sovereignty adopted in this
paper. The state which violates a decree to which it is bound, discovers that it was
never actually bound, and encounters the startling epiphany than it might be
incapable of such self-binding.
VII. To BE BOUND
To be bound means to become limited, confined, or restricted,7 6 with the
connotation, in the strongest sense of the term "bound," suggesting that such
restriction is inescapable. To be bound, in this sense, has a different connotation
than the binding contemplated in contract law, which generally refers to an
obligation adhered to under pain of some negative consequence. 77 More clearly
stated, the bounds brought on through contractual obligation are binding only
insofar as a party wishes to avoid the negative consequences associated with the
breach of that contract. To become bound to the extent contemplated herein
implicates a stronger meaning of the word. The word "bound" can be used to
denote any general obligation, but it can also be used to denote a limit.7" This kind
of limit involves an amount of finality, or a threshold that cannot be crossed. It is
not, as with contract law, a limit that may be surpassed as long as a party is willing
to accept the ramifications of that action.79 Rather, this kind of limit is akin to an
individual confined by bonds, whose movement is thus restricted. For this
individual, it is not some monetary penalty or severed business relation which
forms the boundary of possible action, but the constraints placed upon her. In this
example, the constraints are physical, and may consist of handcuffs, chains, rope,
or some other physical impediment. The constraint called for in the case of the
sovereign is less tangible, but no less real. It consists of the power of the sovereign
state to constrain itself through its will. The truly sovereign state will possess the
76. Bound, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bound (last visited
Mar. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Bound].
77. Contract, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed., 2014) [hereinafter BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY].
78. Bound, supra note 76.
79. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77.
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requisite control over itself to become bound in the same way the captive is bound:
it is not simply obligated to refrain from some action; rather, a truly sovereign state
will not engage in that action. In a sense, the sovereign state cannot violate such
bounds, for it will then cease to be sovereign in the robust sense understood herein.
For the purposes of this paper, "cannot" and "will not" amount to the same result: a
bar to action. In the case of the captive, this inaction is involuntary. For the
sovereign state, it is necessarily voluntary.
If a state ostensibly claims to bind itself, but later rescinds its agreements,
then there was an escape from the professed binding, and thus the state was never
truly bound at all, having possessed the same means of escaping its obligations
from the moment those obligations were incurred. If the captive is placed in
bonds, and, upon her first attempt to escape, discovers that the ropes placed around
her arms were never tied, it turns out she was not bound, and that she is free to
flee. To adopt a weaker understanding of what it is to be bound is to weaken the
conception of sovereignty, as to do so would suggest that sovereign states are not
the kinds of things capable of binding themselves in this strongest sense.8 0 The
state that willingly breaks these types of covenants discovers it lacks the ability to
truly bind itself, or at the very least, that it failed to bind itself on that occasion.
Such a failure is illustrative of a state's inability to bind itself, or, of a state's
inability to bind itself every time it purports to do so. That state therefore reveals
that it does not truly have the power ascribed to a sovereign. Consider the state
that enters into a treaty with another state, but which later violates the terms of that
treaty. With this violation comes the revelation that the restraint on the part of the
violating party was only a product of what the state deemed best or convenient at
the time the treaty was entered into. If the state violates its own agreements every
time such a violation is beneficial, then the state demonstrates an inability to bind
itself beyond its own passing whims. Thus it illustrates the low grade of its
sovereignty, as it lacks the power to bind itself beyond the shifting sands of its own
interests and concerns.
Therefore, the question of whether a truly sovereign state can violate decrees
to which it has bound itself is answered in the negative. A sovereign state binds
itself beyond repudiation. Only a state of lesser caliber can coherently violate that
to which it has bound itself. Civil disobedience on an international scale is thus
incompatible with sovereignty.
What then does this mean for an international rostrum in which many of the
main actors can be said to have violated their agreements? Is it the case that, under
this conception, sovereignty is relegated to the theoretical? Sovereignty is viable
80. The obvious difficulty with this understanding of being bound is that it cannot become true,
or at least, cannot be proven to be true, until the time for which the state has agreed to be bound has
passed. However, this epistemological limitation does not alter the reality that the state which violates
its agreements will be known to have failed in its endeavors to bind itself, and thus to have failed to
exercise true sovereign power. Perhaps this limitation simply means that there can only be a
presumption in favor of a state's sovereignty until it commits a breach of this kind.
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on a practical level, but whether it is present will depend on a case-by-case
analysis. As the demarcation between colors on a color spectrum is blurred, so too
may be the line that separates the sovereign from the subjugated. It may simply be
that no case fits neatly within either of these conceptual expressions, but that each
merely falls nearer to one or the other. In the case of sovereignty, the concepts
articulated herein merely serve to establish a metric that aids in the understanding
of whether a certain state falls nearer to or further from sovereignty.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The successful implementation of international law is a contemporary
problem whose elusive solutions have appeared to be particularly fickle. Both
conceptual and practical concerns form barriers to its execution. However, in this
paper I have endeavored to show that one such conceptual problem, that of the
tension between international law and sovereignty, is a problem that dissipates
once the concept of sovereignty is reformulated and properly understood. I then
surveyed current applications of international law in order to determine whether
they comport with this understanding of sovereignty, and whether there is room for
this expression of the freedom of the state. In my examination of the ICJ, I
determined that its current practices do in fact align with the proper understanding
of state sovereignty, and allow for states to exercise their sovereignty. Finally, I
explored whether a sovereign state can engage in a kind of international civil
disobedience by defying a decree to which it has bound itself In light of the
conceptualization of sovereignty adopted herein, a sovereign state does not have
this ability. Only a state with a power less than sovereign may back out of its
obligations, as a truly sovereign state has the ability to bind itself beyond
contravention. The insights of Kant, Endicott, and others reveal sovereignty in its
potent and absolute form, and demonstrate the compatibility of sovereignty and
international law. The favorable environment of the current international theater
exposes the reality that the burden remains on individual states to recognize their
own sovereignty, and to act upon that recognition.
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